



Commander Naval Surface Force




LtCol Paul Miner and Maj Bryan Delgado
COMNAVSURFOR
Combat Cargo



Waterfront Chain of Command



- **CNSF=CNSL+CNSP a single surface TYCOM**
- **Retirement of the Amphibious Group**
- **Emergence of the Expeditionary Str Groups**
- **Emergence of the Class Squadrons (CLASSRON)**



Waterfront Chain of Command



Waterfront Accomplishments



- **COMNAVSURFOR INST 4621.1/COMMARFORCOMO 4621.1/COMMARFORPAC 4621.1B completed on and on the street. Combined three Instructions/directives into one.**
- **Assignment of MCC to new or changed units. Some MCCs still remain with DECOM SHIPS.**
- **MARFORPAC is now in step with MARFORCOM when it comes to paying for MOGAS onload/offload and disposal cost (different process).**
- **Getting the CLASSRON's staffed and running**



Waterfront Priorities



- **LFORM instruction; CNSF 4080 Series editing is now with the MARFORs. Input is due back to CNSF NLT 27 Jun 08.**
- **MWCP 4-11(Combat Cargo Handbook) and MWCP 3-31 (Amphibious Ships and Craft pub) are currently being reviewed and analyzed for republication.**
- **SPI Computer Fielding:**
 - **LOGAIS common capabilities suite for the PhibRon's and the Ships submitted to TDIS.**
 - **A set of vehicle wheel scales will accompany the computers for each big deck and potentially for each LPD (decision pending).**



Waterfront Priorities cont..



- **Unauthorized ShipAlts:**
 - **Changes have been proposed and some made to accommodate the ESG's and the MEU staffs.**
 - **Annual SLCP validation, reporting variances.**
 - **C4I Baseline changes have a specific standards directed by HQMC; await Blue-Green approved all encompassing SCD.**
 - **Bottom-line; Uniform capabilities across the classes of ships. Discipline needed in the Fleet Modernization Program. Ship Change Documents (SDC) should become the norm, not the exception.**



Waterfront Priorities cont..



- **NAVY Staffs, NSE, and “other” units composition:**
 - **Need to review ESG staff and NSE requirements and footprint of supporting personnel/equipment.**
 - **NSE equipment requirements have changed with the Marine Corps over all expansion of equipment.**
 - **Riverine Units and STUAS (RPV) Units may deploy with future ESG deployments. Need to capture EDLs and logistical requirements afloat (like MOGAS usage...) that may impact the Marine Corps.**
 - **Bottom-line: We need a Navy Staff and NSE/Det base-line.**



Landing Force Equipment



Impact on the Fleet

EFV



LVS



MV22



JLTV
(16k)

USMC Aircraft and Vehicle Growth

DESIGN LOADOUT

NEAR TERM (2007-)

NOTIONAL FUTURE* →

MEU Ground
Vehicles and
Equipment

M151/trlr	3000 lb
M35 2.5T	12580 lb
M48 MBT	104000 lb
AAV	55140 lb



M998/armr	7653 lb
MTVR w/MAS	49242 lb
M1A1	135200 lb
AAV7A1	51000 lb



JLTV	~22646 lb
MTVR w/MAS	49242 lb
MPC	~25000 lb
M1A1	140000 lb
EFV	72500 lb

Ground Vehicles and Equipment up to 3x heavier

Air Combat
Element (ACE)

CH 46A	13000 lb
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MV 22	46990 lb
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MV-22 weighs almost 3x CH-46A

AV 8B	24512 lb
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AV 8B	24512 lb
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JSF	46217 lb
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F-35B JSF weighs almost 2x AV-8B Harrier

CH53A	22900 lb
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CH53E	48710 lb
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CH53K	~55000 lb
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**Notional
Aggregate (from
above list)
embarked MEU**

1250 tons



2549 tons




~3455 tons

Increased Weights/Density Impact Deck Strength, Ships Stability.

*Vehicle weights provided by MCCDC and POE 50 reps. Aircraft weights provided by NAVAIR reps




What that extra weight means...



POSITIVE STABILITY

With positive stability, a ship will right itself.



NEGATIVE STABILITY

With negative stability, a ship will continue to roll over.

A High KG Results in Negative Stability...



"Future Naval Operations"



"...the *Naval and Marine Corps Operating Concepts* call for more widely distributed forces to provide increased forward presence, security cooperation with an expanding set of international partners, preemption of non-traditional threats, and a global response to crisis in spite of challenges to access. Collectively, these concepts provide the foundation for selectively conducting either distributed or aggregated operations."

-CMC Posture

Statement, March 2007

The Maritime Strategy "...must reflect the roles and missions we are expected to perform: in the war on terror, in conventional combat campaigns, in defense of the homeland, and in shaping and stability operations. It must strike a proper balance between the enduring requirements for traditional naval capabilities with those needed to squarely confront and influence the highly dynamic security environment of the 21st Century."

-CNO Guidance for 2007, February

2007



Recent Applications of U.S. Amphibious Capabilities




101 in the past 25 years, covering the range of activities described in the national strategy.

❖ **88 conformed to the doctrinal types of amphibious operations:**

- 6 Amphibious Assaults
- 4 Amphibious Withdrawals
- 3 Amphibious Demonstrations
- 2 Amphibious Raids
- 73 "Other Amphibious Operations" such as NEO (12) or HA/DR (26)

❖ **13 classified as "such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct"**





Amphibious Ship Requirement



CCDR Shaping & Crisis Response
Capable of all Naval missions: 2.5+ MEU/ESG
4 X GFS
Enabled by MPF(F) / connectors

Forcible Entry
2 MEB assault echelon
30 Amphib Ships
Reinforced by one MEB
1 x (MPF (F))
Sufficient AFOE

- **Stated Amphibious Ship requirement: 30 operationally available to support a 2 MEB (AE) forcible entry**
- **33 Ships provide necessary maintenance inventory but fail to meet CCDR competing demands for shaping and crisis response**
- **Need to examine alternatives to mitigate risk in providing 30 ships for the AE. Examples:**
 - **Increase amphibious ship inventory or**
 - **Reevaluate MPF (F) to have GFS role**



Waterfront Personnel Issues



CWO3 or CWO4 on big decks; too many CWO2's now.

CLASSRON staffing with experienced CCO's; both gapped now.

Staffing new ships ~4 months prior to delivery; we aren't making that now, troop spaces are suffering.

Too many "Ship to PhibRon" or "Ship to Ship" tours; need new blood/everyone needs to have a shot at a sea tour.

CCO/CCA formal training; none now and it shows.